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Abstract
We examine a recent set of high-frequency spot EUR-USD foreign exchange transaction
data from an electronic foreign exchange market. Our framework is based on a continuous
time-sequential microstructure trade model that measures the market makers beliefs directly.
We present evidence of the strategic arrival of informed traders on a particular day of the week,
time of day and geographic location (market).
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Theoretical market microstructure models have extensively utilized a setting that involves a risk-
neutral competitive market maker who faces two types of traders: informed and uninformed (noise)
traders. Within the context of equity markets, some notable research contributions include Easley
et al. (1996a, 1997a,b). Easley et al. (2002) further extend these theoretical models to allow the
arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades to be time-varying. They show that both informed
and uninformed traders are highly persistent in equity markets.1
Until recently, the lack of transaction data for prices and trading volume has precluded such
research avenues in foreign exchange (FX) markets.2 This paper introduces high-frequency FX
data from EBS (Electronic Broking Services) that cover one year (2005) of trading volume in the
global interdealer spot market. To control for high-frequency noise eﬀects and no-trade periods, we
aggregate to 10-minute data and also focus only on EUR-USD transactions. The electronic market
for the EUR-USD currency pair is largely dominated by EBS, followed by Reuters.
The FX market can generally be described as decentralized and worldwide, but the actual
trading is processed in the bookkeeping of particular markets, with the major ones being London,
New York and Tokyo. Thus, the total trading activity of informed and uninformed traders is
comprised of the geographic contributions of individual market centers. The hours of operation of
the market centers are diﬀerent, but they jointlycontribute to the aggregatemarket trading activity.
For instance, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are
both open from 09:30 to 11:30 EST. In contrast, the lowest market presence outside weekends can
be found during the lunch break at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), when it is night in North
America and Europe.
In this article, we investigate the risk of information trading in the spot EUR-USD market. Our
analysis utilizes the information in the trade data to estimate the arrival rates of both informed
and uninformed traders as well as the probability of informed trading (PIN). In particular, we can
extract a geographical (or the time-of-day) component of the activity of informed and uninformed
traders. Considering the low-transparency feature of the FX market, this exercise is of immense
importance to our understanding of market dynamics. We ﬁnd strong support for an intraday
geographic component in the arrival of both classes of traders. Our analysis reveals that the target
market for informed traders is the NYSE. The activity of the informed traders is particularly strong
after lunchtime in New York until 16:00 EST, when the market closes. Noteworthy is the fact that
the above-average activity of informed traders generally coincides with the above-average activityof
1Another related strand of literature (dynamic heterogeneous agent models) assumes that traders follow two
diﬀerent types of strategies: fundamental and technical trading rules (LeBaron, 2006; Brock and Hommes, 1998).
While fundamentalists make decisions based on some perceived fundamental value, chartists rely on past prices or
past microstructure variables such as order ﬂow.
2The exceptions are Lyons (1995), Payne (2003), and Marsh and O’Rourke (2005). The ﬁrst two papers use one
week of trade-by-trade data, while Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) use about one year of daily data.
1uninformed traders, and vice-versa. This indicates to a certain extent the strategic arrival timing
of informed traders who tend to conceal their activity by transacting together with uninformed
traders. This result is conﬁrmed by the day-of-week analysis and is similar to evidence presented
by Kyle and Villa (1991) for the equity market, where “noise trading” provides camouﬂage for a
proﬁtable takeover by a large corporate outsider.3
2. Independent Arrival Model
The model consists of informed and uninformed traders and a risk-neutral competitive market
maker.4 The traded asset is a foreign currency for the domestic currency. The trades and the
governing price process are generated from the quotes of the market maker over a trading day of
twenty-four hours (or 144 ten-minute intervals). Within any trading interval, the time is continuous,
and the market maker is expected to buy and sell currencies from his posted bid and ask prices.
The price process is the expected value of the currency based on the market makers information
set at the time of the trade.
The arrival of news to the market occur with probability α. This is comprised of bad news
with probability δ and good news with 1 − δ probability. Let {si} be the price process over
i = 1,2,...,144 periods. si is assumed to be correlated across trading periods and will reveal
the intraday temporal eﬀects and intraday persistence of price behavior across these two classes of









i are the prices conditional on bad news, no news and good news, respectively. Within
each time period, time is continuous and is indexed by t ∈ [0,T].
On any trading period, the arrivals of informed and uninformed traders are determined by
independent Poisson processes. At each instant, uninformed buyers and sellers each arrive at a rate
of ε. Informed traders only trade when there is news and arrive at a rate of µ. All informed traders
are assumed to be risk-neutral and competitive, and they are thus expected to buy when there is
good news and to sell otherwise to maximize their proﬁts.5 For good news, the arrival rates are
ε+µ for buy orders and ε for sell orders. For bad news, the arrival rates for buy orders are ε, and
ε + µ for sell orders. When no news exists, the buy and sell orders arrive at a rate of ε per hour.
The market maker is assumed to be a Bayesian who uses the arrival of trades and their intensity
to determine whether a particular trading period belongs to a no news, good news or bad news
category. Since the arrival of news is assumed to be independent, the market maker’s hourly
decisions are analyzed independently from one period to the next. Let P(t) = (Pn(t),Pb(t),Pg(t))
3In contrast to our paper, Easley et al. (2002) do not ﬁnd any evidence of strategic behavior by informed traders.
They document that uninformed traders seem to avoid informed traders by “herding.”
4In this section, our framework follows Easley et al. (1996b).
5This assumption may seem inappropriate given that it rules out any strategic behavior. As will be shown later,
informed traders have some tendency for strategic trading. Therefore, we concur that the assumption of risk-neutrality
needs more defending, but for the sake of the model applicability, it will not be dropped.
2be the market maker’s prior beliefs at no news, bad news, and good news at time t. Accordingly,
his/her prior beliefs before trading starts each day are P(0) = (1 − α,αδ,α(1 − δ)).
Let St and Bt denote sell and buy orders at time t. The market maker updates the prior
conditional on the arrival of an order of the relevant type. Let P(t|St) be the market maker’s
updated belief conditional on a sell order arriving at t. Pn(t|St) is the market maker’s belief about
no news conditional on a sell order arriving at t. Similarly, Pb(t|St) is the market maker’s belief
about the occurrence of bad news events conditional on a sell order arriving at t, and Pg(t|St) is
the market maker’s belief about the occurrence of good news conditional on a sell order arriving
at t.









Since each buy and sell order follows a Poisson process at each trading hour and is independent,
the likelihood of observing the data M = (Bi,Si)I
i=1 over twenty-four hours (I=144 ten-minute











(1 − α)εBi+Si + αδe−µTεBi(µ + ε)Si + α(1 − δ)e−µTεSi(µ + ε)Bi￿


















(lnBi! + lnSi!) (3)
As in Easley et al. (2002), the log-likelihood function, after dropping the constant and rearranging6,
6To derive Equation 4, the term ln[x
Mi(µ+ε)
Bi+Si] is simultaneously added to the ﬁrst sum and subtracted from
the second sum in Equation 3. This is done to increase computing eﬃciency and ensure convergence in the presence











α(1 − δ)e−µxSi−Mi + αδe−µxBi−Mi + (1 + α)xBi+Si−Mi￿
where Mi ≡ min(Bi,Si) + max(Bi,Si)/2, and x = ε
ε+µ ∈ [0,1].
3. Data and Estimation Results
3.1. Overview of EBS and Temporal Eﬀects
Our data set is from EBS and consists of tick-by-tick FX transaction prices and volume indicators7
for the EUR/USD exchange rate spanning January 3 through December 23, 2005 for the total
of 51 weeks (255 days). EBS operates as an electronic limit order book and is used for global
interdealer spot trading. It is dominant for the EUR-USD and USD-JPY currency trading, while
the GBP-USD currency pair is traded primarily on Reuters (Chaboud et al., 2008). The average
daily EUR-USD trading volume (in USD) on EBS in 2003 was between 50-70 billion dollars, which
is well above that of the NYSE (40 billion dollars). In order to avoid extremely high-frequency
noise and no-activity periods in very small time windows, we aggregated the data over 10-minute
intervals. This gives us 144 observations over each 24-hour period. On average, there are roughly
8,000 buy orders and 6,000 sell orders on a given day. With regard to trader behavior, as we only
focus on the informational component (i.e., informed vs. uninformed), market participants in the
FX market can be treated in a fashion similar to those in equity markets.
The data allow us to identify the number of buy (B0
t) and sell (S0
t) trades for each 10-minute
window. When we plot the number of 10-minute buy and sell arrivals (B0, S0), strong daily temporal
eﬀects and a time trend in both series are evident. Therefore, we ﬁrst estimate the linear time trend,
ˆ Bt and ˆ St, from the trend regression, which is free of temporal and irregular ﬂuctuations. Assuming
a set of multiplicativeseparable temporal eﬀects, we divide the original series by the trend estimates












In order to estimate an index for each 10-minute interval, we averaged the values of ˜ sB
t and
˜ sS
t corresponding to the same 10 minutes of the day across the sample and obtained the ﬁnal 10-
7EBS does not provide exact volume ﬁgures, but “size indicator values,” i.e., the letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G
that correspond to volume intervals. For our application, we are only interested in the number of buy/sell orders;
consequently, volume indicators are not used in the paper.
4minute-of-day indices sB
i and sS
i ,i = 1,2,...144 for the 24-hour cycle. The adjusted number of











, i = 1,2,...,144
for each 255 days in the sample.
Figure 1 shows the ﬁnal 10-minute-of-day indices sB
i and sS
i ,i = 1,2,...144, for the number of
buy and sell trades starting at 00:00 EST. The number of buy and sell trades starts to increase
after 03:00 EST and becomes above average after 06:00 EST. Another sharp increase is observed
around 12:30 EST. The number of trades starts to decline after the NYSE closes. They remain
relatively low and stable during the following hours until midnight. In the lower panel of Figure 1,
the sample autocorrelation functions of the adjusted number of buy and sell arrivals are studied at
10-minute lags. The strong daily temporal eﬀects are removed, and a strong persistence in both
series is revealed.
3.2. Informed traders, uninformed traders and the PIN
According to the Easley et al. (1996b) model, the expected value of the total number of trades per
unit time, E(TT) = E(S + B), is equal to the sum of the Poisson arrival rates of informed and
uninformed trades:
E(TT) = α(1 − δ)(ε+ µ + ε) + αδ(µ + ε + ε) + (1 − α)(ε + ε) = αµ + 2ε
The expected value of the trade imbalance E(K) = E(S − B) is given by
E(K) = αµ(2δ − 1)
, which provides information on the arrival of informed trades. When µ is large, the following
approximate relation holds
E(|K|) ' αµ.
Accordingly, the absolute trade imbalance |K| provides information on the arrival of informed
trades, αµ, while the diﬀerence between the total trade TT and the absolute trade imbalance |K|
contains information on the arrival of uninformed trades, ε. If we assume that the probability
of information events α is constant, the time-of-day average of the absolute trader imbalance |K|
provides information on the intraday temporal eﬀects of the orders from informed traders. In other
words, it is possible to obtain a measure of the activity time of the informed traders, since we know
the number of trades occurring during each 10-minute period of the day. Similarly, we can identify
whether uninformed traders (liquidity traders) follow a distinct intraday pattern.
Figure 2 plots the hour-of-day indices of informed (top) and uninformed (bottom) traders, based
on unbalanced traders (|K|) and balanced traders (TT − |K|). Note that both |K| and TT are












































Figure 1: Top: 10-minute-of-day indices sB
i and sS
i ,i = 1,2,...144, for the number of buy (top left) and
sell (top right) trades starting at 00:00 EST. Bottom: Sample autocorrelation functions at 720 ten-minute
lags (5 days) of the adjusted number of buy and sell trades.
calculated from Bt and St so that we do not expect any time-of-day eﬀects a priori.8 However,
the hourly activity of uninformed (liquidity) traders starts increasing after the LSE opens (03:00
EST). The activity is above average from 06:00 EST until 17:00 EST. Note that the above-average
variation of the 10-minute-of-day index of uninformed traders is between 1 and 2.5 and, in addition,
that the ﬂuctuations are relatively smooth. Therefore, we may speculate that uninformed traders
8Thus, “hidden” time-of-day patterns are present even after Bt and St are adjusted for temporal eﬀects. Since
these eﬀects are strong enough to persist even after adjusting for intraday time dependency, we will concentrate on
them for the remainder of the paper.
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10min−of−day Index, Informed Traders
Figure 2: 10-minute-of-day indices of informed (top) and uninformed (bottom) traders over 24 hours, based
on unbalanced trades (|K|) and balanced trades (TT − |K|). The 10-minute-of-day index of uninformed
traders is above average from about 06:00 EST to 17:00 EST and is relatively stable, indicating a non-
strategic arrival. The same index of informed traders is concentrated in the period after the lunch time in
New York until 16:00 EST, when it is highly above average.
arriveduring thistime non-strategically. In contrast, the 10-minute-of-dayindex of informed traders
reveals a diﬀerent picture. It is almost entirely focused on the period after the lunch time in New
York (13:00 EST) and 16:00 EST. The volatility of informed traders during that period is high: the
index ﬂuctuates between 1 and 4.5. It is possible that traders exchange private information during
lunch-time and then trade on it, thus generating such excess volatility in their after-lunch arrival.
Finally, the Tokyo activity is always below average for both classes of traders.
7Index Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
SIα 0.88 0.97 0.99 1.05 1.08
SIδ 1.42 0.96 0.75 0.87 0.98
SIε 0.93 1.07 1.11 1.05 0.82
SIµ 1.02 1.09 1.04 0.99 0.84
SIPIN 0.87 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.96
Table 1: Day-of-week indices of estimated parameters and the PIN.
3.3. Model Estimates
The log-likelihood function in Equation 4 is maximized every day (I = 144 ten-minute intervals) for
the entire sample period (255 days). As a result, we have 255 diﬀerent estimates of each parameter.
The two probability parameters α and δ are restricted to (0,1), and the two arrival rates are
restricted to (0,500), since the maximum observed number of buy or sell trades in our sample is
494.9
Table 1 reports the indices (day-of-week index) of the estimated parameters and the PIN.10
The probability of an event α is higher on Thursdays and Fridays. Given that an event occurs,
the probability that it is a bad event δ is lower than the average on all days except on Mondays.
Therefore, we may speculate that during the sample period, Thursdays and Fridays were eventful
days, with good news for EUR-USD.
The estimated probability of an event ˆ α ﬂuctuates between 0.06 and 0.48 with an average of
0.30. This implies that there were no days without an event occurring in a ten-minute interval. The
lowest estimate 0.06 shows that there was a day with only nine ten-minute intervals with an event
((0.06/9)×24 ≈ 1 day). Similarly, the highest estimate 0.48 shows that the most eventful day had
69 ten-minute periods with an event. The Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) does not
reject the null hypothesis of normality at the 1% signiﬁcance level, as the p-value is 0.123. Thus,
for this sample, the market maker views the arrival of news as a normal process. The estimate
that an event is bad news ˆ δ lies between 0 and 0.32, with an average of 0.09. Note that (1 − δ) is
the probability that an event is good news. This indicates that in 2005 there were on average high
expectations of good news. According to the Shapiro-Wilk test, the estimate of δ is not normally
distributed with the p-value=0.000. This is an expected result, as there was a signiﬁcant trend in
USD-EUR prices in 2005 (the market was optimistic about the USD).
The estimated arrival rate of uninformed traders ˆ ε does not exhibit any sharp increases and is
between 5.18 and 65.23. The overall mean of this parameter is 40.66. The estimate follows a normal
distribution, as conﬁrmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test. The estimated arrival rate of informed traders
9For the reasonable choice of the starting values, the estimates are stable over the sample period.
10The day-of-week indices, denoted by SIi (i ∈ {α,δ,ε,µ,PIN}), are found using the ratio-to-moving average
method.
8ˆ µ is volatile with occasional jumps. The Shapiro-Wilk test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of
normality (p-value=0.000). The overall average of this parameter is 63.93, which is substantially
higher than the average ˆ ε. From Table 1, we see less-than-average arrival rates for both informed
and uninformed traders on Fridays. The highest arrival rates of both informed and uninformed
traders are observed on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. Noteworthy is the fact that the market maker
attaches a non-normal (i.e., strategic) component to the arrival of the informed traders, which is
not in line with the model assumption of the informed traders’ risk-neutrality.
Finally, the average estimated PIN is about 0.11 and is thus lower than in equity markets.11
Over the 255 days in the sample, the PIN ranges between 0.02 and 0.20. The day-of-week indices for
the PIN point to Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday as the above-average days. The PIN is below
average on Mondays and Fridays. Therefore, when compared to ˆ µ, except for Mondays, the PIN
appears to be a good indicator of informed trading activity. Although in general, informed traders
attempt to camouﬂage their activity behind uninformed traders, the PIN successfully detects their
behavior. In addition, the fact that the distribution of ˆ µ is non-normal conﬁrms the evidence of
strategic activity by informed traders.
4. Conclusions
Using a high-frequency version of the structural microstructure model by Easley et al. (1996b) for
the FX market, we address a number of important issues and provide new empirical ﬁndings. First,
we estimate parameters that reﬂect market maker’s beliefs about the arrival of informed traders
to the market and the risk of informed trading. We establish the exact timing of the arrival of
not only informed but also uninformed traders. The ﬁndings indicate a strategic component in the
activity of the informed traders that is not observed for the uninformed traders. This phenomenon
operates at diﬀerent levels starting from the geographic intraday eﬀects to the day-of-week eﬀects.
The microstructural analysis presented in this paper is only the ﬁrst step in our understanding how
the features of the electronic FX market are related to the ﬁndings.
11The estimated PIN in equity markets is usually between 0.15 and 0.25.
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